"Today, students are
attempting to occupy the streets outside Hong Kong’s central government
complex; 25 years ago, the students occupied Tiananmen in Beijing. However,
Hong Kong is not Beijing, and 2014 is not 1989. These similar actions have
taken place in entirely different contexts, even though Beijing’s political
control is behind both of the events. It is important for us to identify the
real sources of the current conflicts in Hong Kong, and not get sidetracked by
simple reflections back to Tiananmen.
On the surface, the
turmoil in Hong Kong is caused by Beijing’s decision regarding general
elections. In reality, the deep sources of the conflict are not so different
from the recent large-scale outbreaks of social tensions in Xinjiang, Tibet,
and Taiwan. These tensions should not be seen as isolated political battles
with Beijing, but rather should be heard as both the battle cry of China’s new
identity crisis and a conflict of globalization. For these places,
globalization has to some extent become “Chinaization” or “Mainlandization.”
These recent events can be explained by the globalization theory “Jihad vs.
McWorld.” This theory describes globalization as dialectical interactions
between modern commercial fundamentalism and traditional parochialism. It
argues that the expanding global commerce and the corporate control of the
political process has weakened the autonomy and power of local communities,
threatening the identity and culture of the smaller communities while at the
same time leading to the reassertion of
In Hong Kong we can see
clearly the effect “McWorld” has had, even though the further integration with
mainland China brought prosperity to the city. But most of the advantages and
profits produced by this process have gone to business tycoons and corporate
elites. Much like the American rallies against the “1%” in recent years, the
remaining grassroots population experiences the problems that this success has
brought.
Due to the arrival of large numbers of newcomers and the flow of
outside capital to Hong Kong, the real estate market has skyrocketed, pricing
out much of the population while also increasing everyday cost of living. Large
numbers of visitors have made the city quite crowded, leading the local people
to worry that further integration will threaten their way of living, the
identity of the city, and most of all the distinction of Hong Kong from the
mainland that they so cherish.
In Xinjiang, Taiwan, and Tibet there is another story of
globalization. The Uighurs, Taiwanese, and Tibetans feel they have been
marginalized. For the Uighurs population, their response is jihad. In recent
years we have seen the violent attacks in Xinjiang and other parts of mainland
China. These violent actions can to some extent be seen as local resistance and
rebellion in response to this marginalization and threat of identity, though
any terrorist actions should be condemned.
Whereas the Hong Kong students went to the street to protest, a
group of Hong Kongese business tycoons went to Beijing and met with the Chinese
leadership. Beijing was pleased to gain their support. It is similarly common
in Taiwan, Tibet, and Xinjiang for elites to have maintained good relations
with Beijing. The CCP has garnered support from the successful elites, while
keeping their growth tied closely to Beijing. There are many cases of major
Taiwanese corporations having relocated their headquarters from Taiwan to the
mainland. The huge market the mainland offers has brought enormous profits to
the Taiwanese business community. For example, a Taiwanese company in Mainland
China manufactures almost all iPhones.
This phenomenon can be explained by another theory of
globalization: “integrated on top, collapsed on the bottom.” When the elites of
the different regions and industries gain from globalization, they become more
united and integrated behind the banner of shared economic interests. On the
other hand, even though the living standards of people in the grassroots have
been improving in recent years, they have suffered many of the negative
consequences of the globalized economy, such as the demise of their established
traditions, cultural morality, and identity.
It is in this identity crisis that the different groups have
chosen to express their protests. The recent student movement in Taiwan against
the Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement with China has been the Taiwanese
response. While the protests in Hong Kong and Taiwan should not be confused for
any type of jihad like that of the Uighurs’, they nonetheless underscore common
issues. Unfortunately, Beijing is not well versed in handling identity issues.
Identity-based conflict is different than interest-based conflict. People won’t
change their cultural identity, whether by intimidation or by compensation.
Both the proposition of bribes and the threat of use of force often only worsen
a situation, as people remain steadfast to their identity. Beijing lacks an
understanding of this concept and how to remedy it.
Hong Kong’s problem will continue for as long as the structural
sources of conflict cannot be addressed. The identity crises in Hong Kong,
Xinjiang, Taiwan, and Tibet will surely become Beijing’s real tests and
dilemmas. How well the Chinese leadership deals with these crises will
determine China’s rise and future development. From this perspective, the
identity issues have a real global impact, as does the street movement in Hong
Kong”
I find this essay very informative and thought I would re-publish the article on my blog for my blog followers. This article was originally published in Times, and was written by Zheng Wang: is the Director of the Center for Peace and Conflict Studies (CPCS) at Seton Hall University in New Jersey.
Identity Crisis - Hong Kong is not Beijing, and 2014 is not 1989
